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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a criminal conviction after a
jury trial in the Fifth Circuit Court for Salt Lake County,
the Honorable Sheila K. McCleve, Judge, presiding.

The case

involved charges of violating Section 105 of the Revised
Ordinances of Salt Lake City prohibiting driving or being in
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol.

Authority for this appeal is provided

in Section 78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court's Instruction No. 16 correctly

state the law regarding "physical control" of an automobile
necessary for conviction of driving under the influence
under Section 105 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
City?
2.

Was there sufficient evidence presented to the jury

to show that defendant/appellant Dennis ("Dennis") was in
actual physical control of his vehicle?
3.

Was the trial court's sentencing of defendant

Dennis under Section 105 proper after the jury had convicted
Dennis of violating Section 105?
4.

Was the trial Court's admission of the intoxilyzer

proper?
DETERMINATIVE ORDINANCES
Section 105, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah
(1984)

Users of drugs and intoxicants. It is
unlawful and punishable as provided in this
section for any person with a blood alcohol
content of .08% or greater by weight, or who
is under the influence of alcohol or any
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol
and any drug to a degree which renders the
person incapable of safely driving a vehicle,
to drive or be in actual physical control of
a vehicle within this city. The fact that a
person charged with violating this section is
or has been legally entitled to use alcohol
or a drug does not constitute a defense
against any charge of violating this section
Section 108, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah
(1965).
Intoxicated person in or about vehicle. It
shall be unlawful for any person under the
influence of alcohol or any drugs to be in or
about any vehicle with the intention of
driving or operating such vehicle.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a a criminal conviction and
sentencing for the violation of Section 105 of the Revised
Ordinances of Salt Lake City for driving or being in actual
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol.

After a trial in the Fifth Circuit Court, the

Honorable Judge Sheila K. McCleve presiding, a jury found
Dennis guilty of Section 105. A motion for new trial was
made and denied and Dennis was sentenced for violating
Section 105.

The facts, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the jury's verdict are as follows:
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FACTS
1.

Dennis testified that on February 23, 1986 after

completing a day of skiing at Park City, he had "several
glasses of scotch "prior to eating some pizza for dinner at
approximately 9:00.

(R. 171.) Dennis weighs 170 pounds (R.

277) and had no lunch on the day in question.

(R. 276.)

Along with the pizza, and after the scotch, Dennis also
drank wine prior to getting in his car to head for Salt Lake
City.

(R. 278.) Dennis admitted that while driving home he

became lost on Foothill Drive and "at that time, I felt very
tired and I felt the effects of alcohol coming on, I decided
just to go to sleep."
2.

(R. 268-269.)

Dennis left his driving lights on and left his

vehicle running while he was sleeping.

(R. 275.) All that

would have been required for Dennis to drive the van was for
him to wake up from his drunken nap, take the emergency
brake off and put the automatic transmission in drive.

(R.

282. )
3.

Salt Lake City Police Officer D. W. Holmes was

called to the scene of 1240 South Foothill Drive after a
report over the radio of a vehicle at that location.

(R.

159, 169.) Officer Holmes arrived to find Dennis's van
parked in a traveled roadway portion of Foothill Drive.
175.)

(R.

Holmes observed Dennis seated behind the steering

wheel of the van with the engine running.

(R. 160. ) After

receiving no response to his attempts to obtain Dennisf s

-3-

attention from outside the vehicle Holmes opened the
driver's door and turned off the ignition key whereupon
Dennis woke up.

(R. 160-161.) Holmes questioned Dennis and

noted his confusion and slurred deliberate speech as well as
an odor of alcohol within the vehicle.
4.

(R. 161- 162.)

After Dennis got out of the van almost falling to

the ground Officer Holmes also noticed a very strong odor of
alcoholic beverage on Dennis himself and began to suspect
that Dennis might be intoxicated.

(R. 162-163.)

Officer

Holmes then had Dennis perform four field sobriety tests
which were all failed miserably.

(R. 163-167.)

At that

point Officer Holmes placed Dennis under arrest for driving
under the influence of alcohol.
5.

(R. 167.)

Officer Holmes then transferred Dennis to another

Salt Lake City Police Officer, Jewkes, who had been called
to the scene to transport Dennis to jail.

Officer Jewkes

properly performed an intoxilizer test on Dennis which
showed that Dennis's blood alcohol content was .22, almost
three times the legal presumption level.

(Exhibits 1 and 2,

R. 250.)
6.

During the course of the trial discussions took

place between the trial court and counsel on at least three
separate occasions concerning Dennis's counsel's request for
an instruction on the "lesser included offense" of being
intoxicated in or about a vehicle under Section 108 of the
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City.
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(R. 113-119, 228-249,

and R. 283-295.)

The trial court ruled that, if the facts

supported the possibility that a jury could find Dennis
guilty of Section 108, but not Section 105, then Dennis was
entitled to a lesser included offense instruction pursuant
to State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 151 (Utah 1983).
7.

(R. 284.)

There was also discussion between the trial court

and counsel to the effect that, if Dennis were convicted of
both Section 108 and Section 105, he would have to be
sentenced under the lesser of the two statutory penalties.
(R. 245.)

To avoid the possibility of conflicting

convictions the trial judge gave Instruction No. 19.

(R. 67

& 304.)
8.

The trial court also gave an instruction defining

"actual physical control" as used in Section 105.

The trial

court's Instruction No. 16 read:
You are instructed that to be in "actual
physical control" of a motor vehicle the
defendant need not be exercising conscious
volition with regard to the vehicle and the
vehicle need not be in motion, so long as the
defendant, of his own choice, placed himself
behind the wheel, either started the motor or
allowed it to run. (R. 64 and 303.)
9.

Contrary to the representation in Dennis's Brief,

at page 11, the City Prosecutor did not say that Instruction

There is absolutely no support in the record for Dennis's
unreferenced quotation at page 3 of his brief that "prior to
that both counsel had been convinced that Judge McCleve
would only impose the sentence for violating Section 108 if
the defendant was convicted."
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16 had "come directly from Garcia v. Schwendiman [645 P.2d
651 (Utah 1982)]."

Instead, the Prosecutor said that the

instruction was "taken from a charge that was prepared based
on the Garcia case . . . ."

(R. 232, 213-214.)

Defense

counsel raised no exception to Instruction No. 16.
294.)

(R. 293-

Only after the charge to the jury did defense counsel

object to Instruction 16 claiming that it did not properly
represent the Supreme Court's "actual physical control"
standards established in Garcia.

(R. 318-322.)

This was

despite the fact that the City Prosecutor gave defense
counsel a copy of the Garcia opinion early in the morning.
The trial court polled the jury to find out whether they had
placed any specific emphasis on Instruction No. 16 and all
four jurors replied in the negative. (R. 323-325.)
Dennis was sentenced for his conviction under Section
105 and a motion for new trial was denied.

(R. 89.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Instruction 16 correctly stated the law in Utah
concerning "actual physical control."

The Supreme Court has

clearly and consistently ruled that "actual physical
control" of an automobile is distinguished from "driving"
and does not require either actual intent nor conscious
volition.

"Actual physical control" simply means that an

intoxicated person seated behind the steering wheel of a car
with the actual ability to drive is a threat to the safety
of the public.

Garcia, supra.
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Dennis was clearly in actual physical control of his
van while seated at the steering wheel in the traveled
portion of the highway with the motor running and the lights
on.

His sole defense was:

"I'm sorry Officer I was so

drunk that I fell asleep"; this excuse is absurd and if
accepted as a valid defense would completely vitiate the DUI
statutes of both Salt Lake City and the State of Utah.
The trial court's giving of a lesser included offense
instruction, at the request of Dennis, was appropriate under
the facts and in no way prejudiced Dennis.

The trial

court's sentencing under Section 105 for a conviction under
Section 105 was entirely appropriate because Section 105 and
Section 108 are separable statutes having different elements
and which are applicable under different circumstances.
Finally, the trial court's admission of the intoxilyzer
results, without proper objection, was appropriate under the
facts and case law.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 16
CORRECTLY STATED THE LAW OF UTAH
REGARDING "ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL" OF
AN AUTOMOBILE NECESSARY FOR CONVICTION
UNDER SECTION 105.
The recent case law on "actual physical control" is all
derived from the implied consent statute cases under Section
41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

The language of that

statute is identical to both the State DUI statute, Section
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41-6-44(1), and Section 105, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
City,

Interpretation of this language by the Utah Supreme

Court is found in three cases:

State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d

404, 483 P.2d 442 (1971); Garcia v. Schwendiman, supra; and,
Lopez v, Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778 (Utah 1986).
In Bugger the defendant's automobile was completely off
the traveled portion of the highway and the motor was not
running.

The defendant was asleep in the automobile but it

is not clear from the opinion whether the defendant was in
2
the back seat or the front seat.

Under the facts of the

case the Court found that the defendant was not controlling
the vehicle.

The Bugger Court, however, expressly noted

that the ruling would likely be different where, as in the
instant case, the motor was running or the driver was in the
driver's seat; it observed:
It is noted that the cases cited by the
[state] in support of its position in this
matter deal with entirely different fact
situations, such as where the driver was
seated in his vehicle on the traveled portion
of the highway; or where the motor of the
vehicle was operating . . . .
Bugger, supra
483 P.2d at 443.
Of course, in this case Dennis was seated behind his
steering wheel in the vehicle on the traveled portion of the
highway, with the motor running.
2
The dissent refers to the vehicle as a truck from which
one could possibly deduce, though it is not in the record,
that the defendant was in the front, or only, seat sleeping.
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The narrow issue in Bugger was later substantially
clarified in Garcia.

In Garcia the defendant's vehicle was

blocked from moving backwards by a concerned citizenfs car
and was faced in front by a fence.

A police officer

reporting to the scene observed Garcia attempting to start
his car with the keys in the ignition.

The Supreme Court

extensively reviewed the law from other jurisdictions across
the country to determine what constituted "actual physical
control."
The Court noted that Bugger was simply a factual
decision and did not apply a general rule.
at 653.

Garcia, supra,

The Court held that:

Acts short of starting the motor have been
held to constitute actual physical control in
other jurisdiction. Garcia, supra at 653.
The Court cited, with approval, an Oklahoma case holding:
We believe that an intoxicated person seated
behind the steering wheel of a motor vehicle
is a threat to the safety and welfare of the
public. . . . The defendant when arrested
may have been exercising no conscious
volition with regard to the vehicle, still
there is a legitimate inference to be drawn
that he placed himself behind the wheel of a
vehicle and could have at any time started
the automobile and driven away. Garcia,
supra, at 653 citing Hughes v. State, Okl.
Cr., 535 P.2d 1023, 1024 (1975). (Emphasis
added.)
Of course, in the instant case the vehicle was already
started and running.
The Court also cited with approval another case whose
facts are even closer to the instant case.
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In City of

Cincinnati v. Kelley, 351 N.E.2d 85 (Ohio 1976),

an

intoxicated motorist seated in the driver's seat of a
legally parked car with his hands on the steering wheel and
the keys in the ignition was found to be in actual physical
control of his vehicle, even though the engine was off.

To

reiterate, to the point of redundancy, Dennis's vehicle was
running and he was in the travelled portion of the street.
The Court in Garcia also cited the case of State v.
Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1981), where defendant who
had been found inside a pickup truck seated behind and
leaning against a steering wheel was held to be in "actual
physical control" of the vehicles.

The Garcia Court noted,

Garcia, supra at 654,:
While there was uncertainty as to whether the
motor was running, the court held that
"[w]hether a motor must be running before a
person may be in actual physical control is
essentially a policy issue." 308 N.W.2d at
320.
After this exhaustive review of national case law the
Court stated its holding in Garcia as follows:
As a matter of public policy and statutory
construction, we believe that the "actual
physical control" language of Utah's implied
consent statute should be read as intending
to prevent intoxicated drivers from entering
their vehicles except as passengers or
passive occupants as in Bugger, supra.
Therefore, under the facts before us, where a
motorist occupied the driver's position
behind the steering wheel, with possession of
Garcia, supra at 654.
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the ignition key and with the apparent
ability to start and move the vehicle,, we
hold that there has been an adequate showing
of "actual physical control" under our
implied consent statute• Garcia, supra at
654. (Emphasis added, footnote omitted.)
Footnote 3 to the quotation cited above notes that
Garcia was having difficulty starting his car because of his
degree of intoxication.

The Court observed that:

[N]othing in the record warrants a finding
that the plaintiff was physically unable to
start the car, as would be the case with an
unconscious or sleeping motorist. Garcia,
supra at 654, fn. 3.
In the instant case Dennis's van was already started.
All that was required for Dennis to do to move the car was
to wake up in his drunken stupor, take off the emergency
brake and engage the automatic transmission.
In Lopez v. Schwendiman, supra, the intoxicated
defendant was found asleep in the driver's seat with his
head resting on the wheel.

The truck's motor was not

running, but there were tracks of the pickup in the freshly
fallen snow.

As a defense, Lopez contended that the truck's

battery was dead and that he was merely waiting for his wife
to come tow the truck home.

The Court noted that the

"inoperability" defense did not protect the defendant.
Court held:
Utah's statute provides for the arrest of one
"in actual physical control" of the vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol and/or
drugs. That requirement was intended by our
legislature to protect public safety and
apprehend the drunken driver before he or she
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The

strikes, . . . and may not be construed to
exclude those whose vehicles are presently
immobile because of mechanical trouble.
Lopez, supra at 781.
Again, in the instant case there was no mechanical trouble
with the vehicle which was running when the police arrived.
This extensive review of the law establishes
conclusively that the Court's Instruction No. 16 was
appropriate given the facts of this case. As the Court
noted in Garcia, supra at 655:
Similarly, we find it unnecessary for the
[state] to show actual intent under the
control provisions of the implied consent
statute. Just as an intent to drive is
inferred from one's actual driving, so also
may an intent to control a vehicle be
inferred from the performance of those acts
which we have held to constitute actual
physical control.
In Lopez and Garcia the Court held, in much the same
language as Instruction 16, that a defendant who places
himself behind the wheel of a car while intoxicated was
guilty of "actually physically controlling" a vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol.

Instruction 16 was a

correct statement of the law and should be affirmed by this
Court.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS MORE THAN
SUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAT DEFENDANT WAS IN
ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF HIS VEHICLE.
The facts which were brought out at trial are
extensively stated in the Statement of the Case above, pp.
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3-6, and will not be reiterated in detail here.

Simply put,

Dennis admitted, and the police testified, that Dennis was
stone drunk and asleep behind the wheel of an automobile
whose engine was running and which was in the traveled
portion of the roadway.

There is simply no significant

dispute about these facts and they are more than sufficient
to meet any burden of proof possibly required.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S SENTENCING OF THE
DEFENDANT UNDER SECTION 105 FOR HIS
CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 105 WAS PROPER.
Over the strong objections of the City Prosecutor, the
Court gave three instructions requested by Dennis concerning
the lesser included offense of being drunk in or about a
vehicle under Section 108, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
City.

(R. 303-304).

The trial court apparently concluded

that the facts presented by the defendant's testimony may
have convinced a jury that Dennis was only guilty of being
"drunk in or about" the vehicle, rather than being in
"actual physical control" of the vehicle.

Given this belief

the Court properly read State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah
1983) to require giving an instruction on a lesser included
offense, even though Section 108 was not a "necessarily
included" offense.

These instructions were, since they had

been requested by Dennis, obviously not objected to by
Dennis.
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The facts in this case are so compelling for conviction
that a directed verdict would have been appropriate, if such
an option were available in criminal cases.

Thus, even

having the benefit of this lesser included instructions the
jury found Dennis guilty of Section 105 for being in "actual
physical control" of his vehicle.

Dennis was then

appropriately sentenced for violating Section 105.
Dennis now claims that Section 105 and Section 108 are
identical and therefore subject to the generally accepted
rule that:
Where there are two statutes which prescribe
the same conduct but impose different
penalties, the violator is entitled to the
lesser. Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108,
1109 (Utah 1977). (Footnote omitted.)
There is a significance weakness in Dennis's argument
which the Court set out in the very next sentence in
Rammell, supra at 1109:
The difficulty with petitioner's argument is
that the two statutes referred to do not
prohibit exactly the same conduct. (Emphasis
added.)
Similar to that caveat, Section 105 and Section 108 in the
instant case do not prohibit the same conduct.
One can quite easily envision circumstances where a
conviction under Section 108 would be appropriate, but a
conviction under Section 105 might prove impossible.

For

example, an intoxicated individual could get in the wrong
car and thus be incapable of controlling the vehicle.
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Similarly, an intoxicated defendant could pick up the wrong
keys for his own car and thus be unable to control the
vehicle.

Section 108 only requires "intent[] to . . .

operat[e]" whereas Section 105 requires "actual physical
control. " Since the two statutes, Section 105 and Section
108, do not proscribe

the same conduct they do not entitle

Dennis to the lesser sentencing.
The other cases cited by Dennis in his brief are
similarly unavailing.

State v. Loveless, 581 P.2d (Utah

1978) simply quotes and reiterates Rammell.

State v. Fair,

23 Utah 2d 34, 456 P.2d 168 (1969), and State v. Shondel, 22
Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969), merely restate the general
rule concerning identical offenses.

State v. Kish, 28 Utah

2d 430, 503 P.2d 1208 (1972), is absolutely and totally
irrelevant.

Kish deals with a co-defendant accepting a plea

bargain while another defendant chose to go to trial.

It

has no bearing on the question of lesser included offenses.
Dennis also makes an argument to the effect that the
Judge, by agreeing to allow a lesser included offense
instruction somehow is bound to sentence on the lesser
included offense even if the conviction was for the greater
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offense.

This illogical argument is not supported by any

relevant cases.

The two cases cited by Dennis allegedly

supporting this proposition are totally off point.

In both

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 92
S.Ct. 495 (1971) and State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986)
the issue involved whether the trial court's acceptance of a
plea bargain, with sentencing restrictions, was appropriate.
In Santobello a change of counsel for the prosecution
resulted in the prosecutor violating a plea bargain
agreement for a "no recommendation" on the sentence.

The

Court held that such a violation of a plea bargain agreement
required remand.

In Kay the Utah Supreme Court considered

whether the trial court could refuse to adhere to the terms
of a plea bargain which allowed the defendant to plea guilty
to three counts of capital homicide in exchange for a life
imprisonment sentence, without the possibility of death.
The Court found that numerous errors by the trial court and

Dennis's brief intimates that he was somehow "sandbagged"
into taking the stand and "confessing" due to confusion on
his counsel's part concerning sentencing in the event that
he was convicted under both Section 105 and Section 108.
(See, e.g. Brief of Appellant pp. 8-10 and 13-17.) The
primary weakness in this argument is that it is totally
unsupported by the record. There is no evidence in the
record that Dennis's decision to take the stand was anything
other than a tactical move in an attempt to convince the
jury to find him guilty of Section 108, rather than Section
105. Dennis cites no case law, and there obviously is none,
supporting his porposition that this Court should relieve
him of his tactical error at trial.

-16-

the defendant's counsel allowed the invalidation of the plea
bargain agreement.
The trial court in the instant case was instead faced
with a defense request for instructions on a lesser included
offense.

There was no guarantee that the Court would

sentence under Section 108 instead of Section 105.

In fact,

what the Court stated was that if Dennis was convicted on
both Section 105 and Section 108 he could only be sentenced
under the lesser offense.

The relevant portion of the

transcript reads as follows:
MR. KEESLER: I'd like to make sure I follow
the analogy that Counsel is saying. Counsel
is saying that in every event if a person is
guilty of a major offense and a lesserincluded offense,, he can only be found guilty
of the lesser-included offense?
MR. McINTYRE:
under--

Or he must be sentenced

THE COURT: He must be sentenced under the
lesser-included offense, and that's a rule
that Justice Durham wrote in Baker, and—and
the Court followed.
Well, that's--you know-(Inaudible)
MR. KEESLER: Everyone who commits murder can
also commit manslaughter. So you're saying
that every murder case then must be sentenced
as a manslaughter.
MR. McINTYRE:
THE COURT:

No, no, i f —

No, if the facts—

MR. McINTYRE: If—it must be submitted under
manslaughter, and then if he's convicted of
it, he has to--
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THE COURT: And to not give a lesser-included
offense instruction is reversible error. But
let me take a look at Baker, and I-MR. KEESLER: Well, if I understood Counsel,
he's saying that the defendant could be
convicted of both, but can only be found
guilty of the lesser-included offense.
MR. McINTYRE: No. If he's convicted of
both, he can only be sentenced-THE COURT: If he can be convicted of both,
you have to sentence under the lesser, under
this case. (Emphasis added.) (R. 244-245.)
Of course, the trial court properly avoided the
possibility of conviction on both statutes by giving an
"either or" instruction allowing conviction on only one
violation.

(R. 67, 197, 285 and 304.)

That is exactly what

the jury did.
POINT IV
ADMISSION OF THE INTOXILYZER RESULTS WAS
PROPER AND WAS NOT PROPERLY OBJECTED TO.
One searches Argument IV of Dennis's Brief in vain for
any reference to a proper objection to the admission of the
intoxilyzer results.

In fact, the only objection raised at

trial to the intoxilyzer results dealt with whether the
administering officer's operating certificate for the
intoxilyzer was properly dated.

(R. 215-223, 225, 226-227.)

The transcript of the proceedings concerning the admission
of the intoxilyzer results reads as follows:
MR. KEESLER: . . . We would at this time,
your honor, offer the City's exhibits No. 1
and 2, the operational checklist and the
intoxilyzer test record into evidence.
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MR. McINTYRE:

Objection, your honor.

THE COURT: . . . okay. Let me hear your
grounds for the objection, again, and any
response.
MR. McINTYRE: Your honor, this Officer has
testified that he doesn't -- that his
certification is not a valid certification.
(R. 225-226.)
This appeal is not a Sixth Amendment denial of
effective representation of counsel case.

Dennis can hardly

be claiming that his law partner, who represented him at
trial, and on this appeal, was incompetent at trial.

Rule

103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits . . . evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is affected,
and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one
admitting evidence, a timely objection or
motion to strike appears of record, stating
the specific grounds of the objection, if the
specific ground was not apparent from the
context; . . . (Emphasis added).
The argument which Dennis raises in his brief
concerning the intoxilyzer admission was never presented to
the trial court.

It is thus obviously not proper to raise

this objection for the first time on appeal.

Barson by and

through Barson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832
(Utah 1984).
Even had the objection been properly raised at the
trial court it could not have been sustained.

The law

concerning "actual physical control" of a vehicle necessary
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to convict under Section 105 of the Revised Ordinances of
Salt Lake City was all drawn from the "implied consent
statute" of Section 41-6-44.10 (Utah Code Ann,).

The cases

and law are cited in Point I, supra and make it undeniably
clear that Dennis was in "actual physical control" of his
van which was parked in the traveled portion of the highway,
with the lights on and the motor running.

As the Court

noted in Lopez, supra at 781:
The trial court here found that there were
tire tracks leading up to the vehicle, that
the vehicle had to have reached its point of
rest "apparently on its own power," and that
Lopez had failed the field sobriety tests.
The law and reasoning of Lopez and Garcia are applicable to
the instant case, mutatis mutandis.
An obvious drunk who staggers out of his vehicle which
is left running in the road with the lights on and fails all
the field sobriety tests,provides more than ample probable
cause to an Officer for the admission of an intoxilyzer.

In

any event, having failed to timely object to its admission,
Dennis cannot now complain.
CONCLUSION
Instruction 16 correctly stated the law of Utah
concerning "actual physical control" which does not require
conscious volition, a functioning automobile, or driving.
To meet the actual physical control element, a defendant
simply must place himself behind the steering wheel of a car
with the ignition key.
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In this case, Dennis was drunk, seated behind the
steering wheel of a car that was running with its lights on
and in a traveled portion of the highway.

The jury

correctly found Dennis guilty based on overwhelming evidence
of a violation of Section 105, even though he had the
benefit of a lesser included offense instruction at his
request.

Thus, the Court's sentencing under Section 105 was

entirely appropriate.
The trial court's admission of the intoxilyzer result
was appropriate because there was more than ample proximate
cause for the Officer to administer the test and, more
importantly, defense counsel never properly objected to its
admission.

This conviction and sentence are entirely

correct and should be sustained on appeal.

BRUCE R. BAIRD'
Assistant City Attorney
Attorneys for Respondent
BRB:cc
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